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LICENSING STANDARDS FOR ATOMIC ENERGY LICENSES
ALFRED AVINS*

1. THE SITUATION BEFORE 1954
During World War II, when the first practical application of atomic
energy took place, in the production of the atomic bomb, "'probably the
largest calulated risk anyone ever took' (Smyth Report) was being undertaken."' At that time, the entire project, and indeed, the whole field of
atomic energy, was a complete governmental monopoly. As the court
2
said in Young v. Kellex Corporation:
"As near as a thing could be so made, the atomic bomb was
produced by the United States as a government and a people. Its
making was financed by the government. Title to basic material
and finished product was at all times in the government.
"... Though for reasons deemed sufficient to the government, private corporations were employed in construction and
production processes, the sovereign was always present as a general
owner, directing the work, directly or indirectly paying all bills,
receiving the finished product into its exclusive custody."
It is therefore not surprising that the Atomic Energy Act of 19468 continued that governmental monopoly. The field of atomic production was
new. It had been developed at an enormous government expense. Much
of the "know-how" was classified as secret, hidden from the gaze of ordinary
businessmen. There were national defense overtones running throughout
this entire field. The attendant hazards to the public were unknown. Few
investors were willing to risk their funds in such an uncertain field.
Between 1946 and 1954, however, the picture changed materially.
4
the House report stated:

As

"The organic law makes the production and use of fissionable
material a Government monopoly. Private industry is permitted
neither to own nor possess such material, nor to own or operate
atomic reactors or other facilities capable of producing or utilizing these same materials....
"This report has already summarized the considerations underlying the stringent prohibitions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946
against private participation in atomic energy. It has also made
*B.A. Hunter College, LL.B. Columbia University. Mr. Avins has served as a Special
Investigator in the Election Frauds Bureau of the Attorney-General's office of New
York State, Opinion Clerk to the President Justice of the Municipal Court of New
York City, Research Assistant to the Reporter for the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,
American Law Institute, Law Assistant in the office of the United States Attorney
for the Eastern District of New York, and at present is practicing in New York City.
1. Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corp. et al. v. Carson, 192 Tenn. 150, 239 S.W.2d
27 (1951), aff. sub. nom. Carson v. Roane-Anderson Company et al., 342 U.S. 232,
72 S.Ct. 257, 96 L.Ed. 257 (1952).
2. 82 F.Supp. 953 (U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Tenn., 1948).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1801 et seq.
4. H. R. Rep. No. 2181, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1954).
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clear that changing conditions now not only permit but require a
relaxation of these prohibitions if atomic energy is to contribute
in the fullest possible measure to our national security and progress.
"The recommended legislation therefore permits the Commission to license private industry to possess and use special nuclear
materials. The United States Government, however, would retain
title to such materials. The legislation also permits private persons, under license of the Commission, to own reactors intended
to produce and utilize such materials."
There was increasing pressure from private industry to liberalize the
government's policy and permit private companies to build their own
reactors between 1946 and 1954, as the feasibility of using atomic power
became more and more evident. At first, of course, private companies were
reluctant even to spend sufficient funds in the area to carry on preliminary
research and surveys, but by the time hearings were held on the 1954 Act,
some pioneering companies had actually formulated concrete plans to use
atomic power commercially. Thus the Joint Committee could report
that: 5
"Moreover, the atomic-reactor art has already reached the
point where atomic power at prices competitive with electricity
derived from conventional fuels is on the horizon, although not
within our immediate reach.
". . The Westinghouse Electric Corp. and the Duquesne
Power & Light Co. are now constructing the nation's first largescale atomic-power reactor, which will generate 60,000 kilowatts
of electricity-an amount sufficient to furnish light and power for
a sizeable city.
"Many technological problems remain to be solved before
widespread atomic power, at competitive prices, is a reality. It is
clear to us that continued Government research and development,
using Government funds, will be indispensible to a speedy and
resolute attack on these problems. It is equally clear to us, however, that the goal of atomic power at competitive prices will be
reached more quickly if private enterprise, using private funds,
is now encouraged to play a far larger role in the development of
atomic power than is permitted under existing legislation. In
particular, we do not believe that any developmental program
carried out solely under governmental auspices, no matter how
efficient it may be, can substitute for the cost-cutting and other
incentives of free and competitive enterprise."
And the editor of the first magazine devoted to nuclear energy, in
taking a poll of its readers, found that:6
"Of 10 provisions in the bill upon which specific comment
was invited, the most popular was that authorizing the AEC to
license private industry to own nuclear reactors and other facilities
5.
6.

Ibid., p. 3-4.
Hearings before the Joint committee on Atomic Energy on H.R. 8862 and S. 3323
to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the 1954
Hearings), 83rd Cong., 2d Session, 1954, p. 26. Statement of Jerome D. Luntz.
Editor, Nucleonics (McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., Inc., New York City, N.Y.).
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utilizing or producing nuclear fuels. Everyone expressing an
opinion favored that change."
However, in spite of the general sentiment in favor of licensing industry to build and operate its own nuclear reactors, there were a number
of problems which the Joint Committee had to face in permitting widespread industrial participation in the program, due to the unique features
of the atomic industry. For example, it was the first instance of government regulation of industry in a field where much of the necessary information was clothed in official secrecy. It was probably the first attempt
at comprehensive regulation of an industry that has hardly gotten started;
normally the regulation of business follows, rather than precedes its establishment. The new industry was dependent on the Government for much
in the way of services, materials, and information, and the field was full
of technological uncertainties. 7 And, in addition, there was even some
reluctance to break the government's monopoly, on the theory that it had
done well so far, and that letting private industry in after the government
had spent so much for research would constitute a "give-away". For
example, Congressman Holifield8 said: 9
"Industrial spokesman for changes in the Atomic Energy Act
sound this refrain: Atomic power and other industrial advances in
atomic power will be brought about only by the aggressive, dynamic
activity of private enterprise; progress is held back by the heavy
hand of Government monopoly. It sounds good, but there is more
fancy than fact in the assertion ....
"The blunt fact is that existing atomic energy legislationGovernment monopoly and all-has provided the framework for
great progress in this field."
It was therefore within this framework of a desire upon the part of
the Joint Committee to move forward, tempered by the knowledge of the
uncertainties surrounding just how that forward move should be made,
that the debate as to what standards the Atomic Energy Commission should
use in licensing private companies to come into this field was carried on.
2.

THE DEBATE ON STANDARDS

Having agreed that private companies should be licensed to own and
operate nuclear reactors for commercial purposes, the next problem that
the Joint Committee had to face was: What standards should be used for
the granting or denial of a license to a private company by the Atomic
Energy Commission?
The original draft of the 1954 Act contained no specific standards. A
member of the New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell criticized it as
follows: 10
7.
8.
9.
10.

See Bureau of National Affairs, Atomic Industry Reporter, No. 13, August 31, 1955,
p. 1:100. Statement of Harold Price, Director of the Division of Civilian Application of the Atomic Energy Commission.
A Democrat from California and a Member of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy.
1954 Joint Committee Hearings, p. 21.
Ibid., p. 113. Statement of Paul W. McQuillen.
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"There does not seem to be any standard for the granting or
denial of licenses or for the terms and conditions to be imposed,
nor any requirement of uniformity of basic materials for all
licenses, although that may be expected to result.
"It is suggested in this connection that ..... statutory standards
governing their issuance be set forth in definite terms, providing
for common defense and security, and the protection of public
health and safety. It should be possible for an applicant to obtain
a single license covering all the aspects of whatever is the particular
atomic energy business into which that applicant proposes to
enter."
Criticism of this lack of specific standards for the issuance of licenses
also came from a company which had been actively studying the possibility
of using a nuclear reactor for commercial power purposes. Walker L.
Cisler, President of the Detroit Edison Company, told the Joint Committee:"
"The licensing provisions which I referred to earlier are confusing, in part because the proposed law does not establish standards or minimum requirements ....
"There must be assurance that the owner can use its facilities
without interruption for long periods of time, and the license
must not be subject to revocation except by reason of failure to
observe the terms of the license. Such assurances should be a matter of law rather than left to the discretion of an administrative
body."
Labor 12 also agreed with this view, as the AFL's representative stated:'1
"Thus, the private developers would hold title only on the
basis of a license granted by the Atomic Energy Commission. We
think it quite important that that licensing arrangement be maintained and that the act spell out clearly the conditions, standards,
and requirements under which the license is granted."
As the hearings continued, two specific issues were drawn as to the
standards which the Atomic Energy Commission should use in determining
whether a particular applicant should or should not receive a license. The
first was whether the Commission could discriminate between applicants
on account of the nature of their ownership, and the second was whether
it could discriminate on the basis of whether the Commission considered
the applicant's project feasible or not.
Congressman Holifield 14 was in the forefront of those who feared that
the Commission might discriminate among applicants in favor of giant
corporations. He said: 15
11.
12.
IS.
14.

15.

Ibid., p. 77.
As represented by former Congressman Andrew J. Biemiller, Democrat of Wisconsin,
and a member of the National Legislative Committee of the AFL.
1954 Joint Committee Hearings, p. 272.
Democrats on the Joint Committee did not all seem to share Congressman Holifield's belief.

1954 Joint Committee Hearings, p. 186.
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"If this Atomic Energy Commission wanted to favor certain
great corporate groups to the disadvantage of others, under this
act they could do so, could they not? By the very rights we give
them to exercise administrative discretion, in this bill that we are
considering, the Cole-Hickenlooper bill?"
He also feared that the Commission would favor private corporations
as against public power groups, and desired to prevent such discrimina6
tion. He said:'
"They (public agencies) could operate provided they were
granted licenses by the Atomic Energy Commission. But if the
Atomic Energy Commission, in line with the general purport of
this bill, should direct its licenses to private enterprise,
by the very virtue of the fact that they denied those licenses it
would make it impossible for municipal public-power groups or
rural cooperative groups or any other kinds of public projects to
obtain access to the source material which is owned by the Government, and will continue to be owned by the Government under the
bill, and, therefore, they would be helpless in the case of such an
administrative decision."
On the other hand, most of the witnesses before the Joint Committee,
as well as most of the other members of the Joint Committee, had no such
fear. They did not see any necessity for spelling out this in the Act.
17
Typical of their reactions to this was the following statement:
"Mr. Holifield, I did not comment on it, because it did not
seem to me at this particular juncture the problem of discrimination was a real one. Any licensing system, I suppose, automatically
infers the power to exclude, and that some people would not be
able to get licenses. I assume that the Commission would give
licenses, or exclude people from licenses only in accordance with
standards which were set up in the law and which were fair standards or required by the situation which may exist from time to
time.
...

I think the suggestion for a review board or special court

to pass upon the licenses is an excellent one, and I personally would
endorse it ... "
As the licensing section of the 1954 Act was finally passed,' 8 it contained no provision specifically preventing the Commission from discriminating between large and small corporations or between private corporations and public power groups or rural cooperative groups. However, this
omission is probably due not to the desire of the committee to let the
Commission have such a power of discrimination, but rather to the belief
that, as the bill stood, the Commission had no such power. This view is
fortified by the following statement of one of the Atomic Energy Commissoners made to the Point Committee:19
16.
17.
18.
19.

Ibid., p. 187.
Ibid., pp. 407-8.
Pub. L. No. 703, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 30, 1954). 68 Stat. 919, 42 U.S.C. Sec.
2011 et seq., Sec. 103.
1954 Joint Committee Hearings, p. 600. (Statement of the Atomic Energy Commission, by its Commissioners, all being present, Commissioner Campbell reading).
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"Once the Commission finds that any particular type of reactor has been sufficiently developed to be of practical value for
industrial or commercial purposes, another set of licensing criteria
are called into play-those prescribed in section 103. These criteria
are quite explicit, and afford assurance that any qualified applicant seeking to use such a reactor could obtain a license to engage
in that use, subject, of course, to' the availability of special nuclear
material and to appropriate safety and security safeguards."
The second major issue as to what standards the Atomic Energy Commission should use in determining whether an applicant should be given
a license was whether the Commission should have the power to deny a
license to an applicant because it felt that his project was not practical and
beneficial to the public interest, as distinguished from the negative consideration, which all agreed it should determine, that his project was not
detrimental to national security or public health and safety,20 The Atomic
Energy Commission had felt that it should have the power to deny an
applicant a license if his project was not practical, as the above statement
shows. This position was strongly criticized by representatives of industry
as allowing the Commission too great an opportunity to decide what projects should be carried on and what activities could not be undertaken.
21
For example, General Electric's representative told the Joint Committee:
"To turn to specifics, I would like to comment on some of the
more important tests and conditions which must be met in order
to obtain a license. These provisions are obviously of transcendent importance since they will determine private entry into
the field of atomic energy ...
-

The dangers inherent in making any new use run the

gauntlet of administrative and legislative approval are obviously
considerable.
"The history of industrial progress records instance after
instance where no one except an inventor and a very small group
of backers were convinced of the 'practical value' of a new idea.
Industrial progress would certainly have been very much slower if
a governmental finding of practical value had been a condition
precedent to the introduction of every new idea.
".. . Our aim here is not criticize a legitimate concern with

future uncertainties, but only to indicate the danger to industrial
progress involved. In line with the objective of encouraging
widespread participation by private enterprise, we hope that maximum reliance shall be placed on willingness to risk capital in
determining whether a new idea is of practical value. Except
where there are overriding considerations of health, safety, or
national security, we think the market should determine whether
an idea is of 'practical value.'
. "(2) The useful purpose standard: Section 103, under
which
all utilization facilities must be licensed, provides as one of its
standards that the applicant's 'proposed activities will serve some
20.
21.

See Sec. 103d, Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
1954 Joint Committee Hearings, p. 326. Statement of Francis K. McCune, General
Manager, Atomic Products Division, General Electric Company.

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

useful purpose proportionate to the quantities of special material
to be consumed.' This test raises problems similar to those of the
practical-value test. Unlike the practical-value test, the useful
purpose test must be met for each individual license, not merely
for types of uses. The concept of 'useful purpose' is certainly very
amorphous. If such a standard is necessary, we hope that you may
be able to give some indication in the act what kind of factors the
applicant for license should be able to show, and how the Commission should make its determination. We hope, however, that
the standard may be eliminated entirely, in view of the fact that
the practical value of that type of use has already been approved
by the Commission, the President, and by the Congress at least
by inaction.
"At most, we feel that a useful purpose test should give the
Commission an opportunity to prevent special material from being
wasted on clearly frivolous uses. Where the special material is
available, and the use does not involve dangers to security, health,
and safety, the Commission should not be permitted to ban it
because it disagrees with the applicant as to whether the particular
activity serves a useful purpose."
Likewise, bar association representatives criticized these provisions as
allowing the Commission to take too cautious an attitude in licensing
applicants. They felt that all applicants should be licensed unless such
licensing would cause a positive detriment to the national security or
public health and safety. For example, the Special Committee on Atomic
Energy of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York had this
22
to say:
"WTe fear, moreover, that the 'practical value' test, particularly
when combined with the criterion of 'usefulness' in section 53b,
and the other broad powers and responsibilities of the Commission under the bill, may unduly retard atomic development when
the supply of nuclear materials becomes 'adequate.' If the Commission is put in the position of passing judgment on the wisdom
and utility of each proposed new venture in atomic energy as a
condition of the granting of the necessary licenses, a strong atomicenergy industry will be slow and hard to develop."
Although the "practical value" and "useful purpose" tests were left in
the act as it finally passed, in spite of the criticism of them,23 the Commission's discretion in determining the presence or absence of these factors
is considerably narrower than would appear from the statements quoted
above. For example, Congressman Holified stated that he believed that
the word "practical" had a very broad connotation. 24 And the Joint
Committee Chairman, Congressman Cole, 25 makes clear that the word
"practical" has a very broad meaning in the following exchange: 26
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Ibid., p. 413.
Sec. 102 and 103 (b), Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
1954 Joint Committee Hearings, p. 47.
Republican of New York.
1954 Joint Committee Hearings, pp. 431-2. The "Mr. Cohen" is Karl P. Cohen,
Vice President, Walter Kidde Nuclear Laboratories, Inc.
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"Chairman COLE: Mr. Cohen, during these hearings, Mr.
Holifield has been apparently disturbed about what he fancies
to be the eventual development where the Commission will have
to pick and choose between applicants for licensing. Frankly,
I cannot visualize that development. I want to seek your judgment based on your consideration of this problem and your experience and your knowledge.
"Now assuming that all applicants are qualified and that
their proposal as a sound one-of course, the Commission must
evaluate the character and financial stability and the feasibility
of application before it will grant a license, but assuming that
those are uniform among applicants, and disregarding the security
requirements, then I cannot see whether it would be necessary
for the Commission to select among the applicants.
"I wonder if I am right in that or not. Is it not possible for
the Commission to grant licenses to anybody who applies, any
applicant who is qualified, who has a good sensible program-that
the Commission will grant him a license."
"Mr. COHEN. That is certainly my interpretation of the
licensing clauses and is one of the reasons that we are in favor of
this revision of the act.
"I think under the present bill the Commission, instead of
having to examine in its heart and soul each time an applicant
comes up, what will he contribute to the Commission's program,
would then have an entirely different criterion-what harm will
be done if we give the applicant the license? And if we cannot
find any harm, then we give it to him."
Thus, the intention of Congress was to allow the Commission to deny an
applicant a license only if his project was clearly fantastic, one which
constituted a frivolous waste of special nuclear material. Any sensible
project would have to be licensed by the Commission, without the right
to exercise discretion on its part as to whether the applicant would make
a profit on the project or not.
Furthermore, the Commission has no right to pick and choose among
applicants as to which ones can produce a more practical type of project.
The act specifically provides that licenses shall be issued on a "nonexclusive basis,'27 a provision probably designed to carry out the intention
of Congress that applicants not be treated as contractors. This feeling that
the widest possible licensing should obtain is illustrated by the following
statements of Karl P. Cohen, Vice President of Walter Kidde Nuclear
2s
Laboratories and Congressman Holifield:
"Under the present program of industrial power participation, for example, and under the program of development of
atomic reactors for power which is now proceeding, the Commission has the unenviable job of picking among a number of candidates for various tasks and choosing the one, or the numbers of
them, which they think should be the proper ones to carry it on,
27.
28.

Sec. 103 (b), Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
1954 Joint Committee Hearings, pp. 426-7.
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and they have to use some criteria. I pointed out in my last
testimony that on this basis, if you tried to decide who is going
to build automobiles, you never would pick Henry Ford, but you
would pick two railroad companies and a carriage manufacturer.
This is because the only criterion that a Government agency can
use is past performance, and this means that you are always going
to pick some company or companies to participate in your program or to develop the reactors for you who have done something
in some other field. I merely point out that this is unique, this
is an economic monstrosity."
"Representative HOLIFIELD: I will admit that it is going
to be a very difficult problem to license these companies and to
choose between the many applicants as to which ones shall get
the license. I agree with the validity of your point on that part
of it.
"I certainly agree with you that the widest possible licensing
should obtain. ....

"We must also consider the financial ability of the individual
that wants to go into this program, and it does take companies
with very large capital to go into the reactor-development field,
construction field particularly."
Finally, to encourage the widest possible licensing consistent with the
preservation of national security and public health and safety, the Joint
Committee declined even to require that the Commission find that the
project contemplated by the applicant was beneficial to the public interest.
29
In reporting the bill to Congress, the Joint Committee said:
"Section 103: This section specifies the conditions for the
issuance of licenses for types of utilization of production facilities
that have been found to be of practical value. For each such
type, the Commission is required to issue licenses to all qualified
applicants without other discretion on its part. The licensed operations are subject to regulation by the Commission in the interest
of the common defense and security and in order to protect the
health and safety of the public. The Commission is authorized
to issue licenses for specified periods up to 40 years. Licenses
cannot be granted to any person where the issuance of such a
license would be inimical to the common defense and security or
the health and safety of the public."
This failure to require that the issuance of the license by the Atomic
Energy Commission be based not only on the negative consideration that
no harm will come to the public but also on the positive consideration
that the public will benefit was sharply criticized by two minority members
of the Joint Committee. Congressmen Holifield and Price, in presenting
their views to Congress in an opinion dissenting on this point, said: 30
"The Federal Power Commission observed further that"... the grant of the (license) privilege should depend not'
solely on the negative consideration that national'defense will
29.
30.

H.R. Rep. No. 2181, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1954).
Ibid., p. 123.

LICENSING STANDARDS FOR ATOMIC ENERGY LICENSES

not be harmed, but on the affirmative ground of benefit to the
public interest in electric power and other products of the operation of nuclear reactors as well (p. 1128, hearings).
"Unfortunately, the present bill reflects nothing of this advice from the Nation's outstanding independent power agency,
but relies mainly on negative considerations in licensing. The
analysis of the Federal Power Commission is sufficient to indicate
that the bill is still incomplete, so far as it comes within the scope
of power policy."
Thus, if the project contemplated by the applicant is a reasonable
one, if it does not present a hazard to public health and safety, and is not
detrimental to national security, 31 and if it does not tend to the creation
of a monopoly in violation of the anti-trust laws,3 2 the Commission must
issue a license to the applicant to build the nuclear reactor. It is therefore
clear that the Joint Committee adopted a liberal approach in dealing with
the granting of licenses.

3.

THE ACT IN PRACTICE

The Atomic Energy Act requires that "Such licenses shall be issued
subject to such conditions as the Commission may by rule or regulation
establish to effectuate the purposes and provisions of this act."3 3 Congress
contemplated that the Atomic Energy Commission would, shortly after the
act was passed, issue regulations prescribing the requirements for licensing.
...

But this did not happen immediately. Instead, it took the Commission
6 months to issue a statement saying that they were not yet prepared to
issue the regulations. The reason for this is stated by Congressman Holifield
as follows: 3 4
".... The fact that it has taken 6 months'now for the Atomic
Energy Commission to come up with the statement that they are
not yet ready to reveal the terms and conditions and regulations
for licensing industry indicates to me that they are in a strange
31.

32.

Sec. 103b (2). In its report to the Congress, the Joint Committee said:
Section 182 sets forth the information that the Commission may require in any
application for a license so as to assure the Commission of adequate information
on which to fulfill its obligations to protect the common defense and to protect the
health and safety of the public. H.R. Rep. No. 2181, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1954).
Sec. 105 provides that licenses are not to be granted if the licensee is enabled to
build up a monopoly pattern in violation of the anti-trust laws. And the following
exchange during the 1954 Joint Committee Hearings (p. 629) between Congressman
Holifield and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Admiral Strauss,
shows that it was the intent of the Joint Committee that licenses should not be
issued where such issuance would be inconsistent with the anti-trust laws:
Representative HOLIFIELD. "Yes, I am aware of the whole section and that
takes place after a monoply forms. Its effect is upon a monopoly after it is formed
and it does not contain the language to admonish this Commission to let licenses
in such a way that the monopoly pattern will not form."
Mr. STRAUSS. "I could only speak personally at this point since this is a
matter not considered by the Commission . I should certainly not mind an admonition to avoid the creation of a monopoly, nor do I believe that any of my colleagues
would take any different viewpoint."

33.

Sec. 103a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

34.

Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress of the
United States, 84th Congress, 1st Session, on the Development, Growth, and State
of the Atomic Energy Industry (January 31, February 1, 3, and 4, 1955) (hereinafter referred to as the 1955 Hearings), p. 559.
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field which is foreign from their former functions, and that this
is opening up a completely different function for the Atomic
Energy Commission than any function they have had before;
and it is going to be a much broader field, a field which is going
to require a lot of quasi-judicial and quasi-regulatory powers and
rulings."
Since the regulations had not yet come out, private industry could not
know what criteria the Atomic Energy Commission would use in deciding
whether an applicant would get a license or not. A number of spokesmen
for private industry were still apprehensive that the Atomic Energy Commission would adopt the approach of issuing regulations only for projects
of which they approved. Probably the clearest statement of their position
35
was made by a representative of General Electric Co. He said:
"... An equally basic problem is raised by the scope of the
Commission's power to grant licenses and to control the activities
of licensees. In discharging its responsibilities under the licensing
provisions of the act, how much control is the Commission required to exercise over who is permitted to enter into the atomic
business, and what is done by the participants?
"Under the language of the act the Atomic Energy Commission has very broad discretion. The statutory licensing standards
provide little in the way of specific, detailed guidance. The Atomic
Energy Commission could use its power to grant or withhold
licenses and to supervise the operation of licensees so as to retain
in effect a central planning role in the development of the atomicenergy industry. The crucial issue is whether the Commission,
in fulfilling its obligation must introduce its own conception of
what is 'practical' or 'desirable' into the licensing process. In
other words, must the Commission insist on the right to evaluate
the merits of a project before deciding whether to license it?
"We come back here to the same question discussed in relation
to the adequacy of information: Will initiative for atomic development be centralized or individualized? Either a liberal or a restrictive approach can be adopted. By a restrictive approach I
mean granting materials and operating licenses only to projects
which the Commission deems desirable. By a liberal approach,
I mean granting licenses for any project in which an applicant
has sufficient confidence to be willing to risk his own money,
without an evaluation by the Commission of the particular merits
of the project.
"If the first course is adopted, the result will be to stifle industry initiative. There would be little practical change from
the situation under the old act where the Commission, as a matter
of administrative decision, decided what projects were necessary
or desirable, and then let contracts to companies willing to carry
out such projects.
"We urge the adoption of a very liberal approach. As a general
policy, we believe that all applicants should be licensed as long
as the materials are available, and the proposed use does not
involve dangers to security, health, or safety ....
35.

Ibid., pp. 545-6.
Co.

Statement of Francis K. McCune, Vice President, General Electric
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"... Except in line with the broad standard of avoiding a
completely frivolous use of material, the Commission should not
be expected to concern itself with whether it considers a particular
project desirable or even workable. That decision should be left
solely and exclusively to the applicant. I would prefer running
the risk of wasting some nuclear material, to requiring new ideas
to run the gauntlet of administrative value judgments. The history of industrial progress records innumerable instances where
no one except an inventor and a very small group of backers had
faith in a particular project. Industrial progress would certainly
have been very much slower if an official Government determination that the idea is practical or desirable had been a condition precedent to the introduction of new ideas.
"... Licensees should not simply be treated as a slightly different breed of contractors. We should recognize the basic fact
that the licensee has the right to make his own decisions, and that
he must be given some elbowroom ......
Finally, about nine months after the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was
passed, the Atomic Energy Commission issued the regulations entitled:
"Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities."3 6 This regulation
retains the requirement that the Commission find that the applicant's
facility has a "practical value for industrial or commercial purposes."8 7
The applicant must inform the Commission of his technical and financial
qualifications for carrying on the particular project for which he is applying for a license, 8s and when he proposes to complete it.39 The applicant
must also inform the Commission of sufficient facts to enable it to evaluate
the hazards to be expected from operation of the facility, 40 including a
41
detailed description of its location in relation to the surrounding area,
42
ard what precautions have been taken in case of accident.
As its standard
for issuing licenses, the Commission requires that the facility will not endanger the health and safety of the public, 43 that the issuance of the license
will not be inimical to national defense and security, 44 and that the applicant is financially responsible and technically competent to carry out the
project. 45 The Commission also requires that the activities serve a useful
purpose 46 and that the issuance of the license would not create a situation
47
inconsistent with the antitrust laws.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

10 CFR Part 50, 20 Fed. Register 2486, April 15, 1955. CCH Atomic Energy law
Reporter, Paragraph 9705.
Sec. 50.22. And see the address of Harold Price, Director, Division of Civilian
Application, AEC, delivered before the Section of Public Utility Law, American
Bar Association, Aug. 23, 1955. CCH Atomic Energy Law Reporter, Paragraph 2033.
Sec. 50.33 (b).
Sec. 50.33 (c).
Sec. 50.34 (a).
Sec. 50.34 (b) and (c).
Sec. 50.34 (e), (f) and (g).
Sec. 50.40 (a).
Sec. 50.40 (c).
Sec. 50.40 (b). And see the remarks of Mr. Charles G. Manley, Division of Civilian
Application, AEC, July 27, 1955. CCH Atomic Energy Law Reporter, Paragraph
2032.
Sec. 50A2 (a).
Sec. 50.42 (b).
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In addition, the Commission has issued several regulations which pertain to licenses, such as one governing the licensing of facility operators, 48
one governing special nuclear material, 49 and one designed to protect public
health and safety. 50 Appropriate forms have also been issued for licenses. 51
By the time one year after the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 had elapsed,
only nine requests for licenses by private industry or educational institutions had been received by the Atomic Energy Commission. These requests
came from Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Armour Foundation of
the Illinois Institute of Technology, Battelle Memorial Institute, Naval
Research Laboratory, University of California at Los Angeles, University
of Michigan, Metals and Controls Corp., Pennsylvania State University,
and Commonwealth Edison Co., of Chicago. Probably the most significant
of these requests for licenses came from Consolidated Edison Co. of New
York, which applied for a license to construct and operate, for a period of
40 years, a nuclear power reactor of the pressurized water type, using fully
enriched uranium 235 as a fuel and thorium as a blanket.5 2 This company,
which supplies electricity to New York City, proposed to build the reactor
from its own funds. It is to be located about 30 miles from the New York
City limits, on the Hudson River, and is to be used to generate electric
power for normal use by consumers. This application is under consider3
ation.
4.

ATiITUDE OF THE COURTS

During the hearings on the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it was feared
that the Atomic Energy Commission might arbitrarily refuse to issue a
license to an applicant. In such a case, the applicant would undoubtedly
want to obtain a review of its determination by the courts. As Congress54
man Holifield asked a witness:
"Assuming again that there might be 50 people waiting to go
into this business and assuming only 10 licenses were granted, it
would be evident that there would be a limited licensing of
reactors.
"Therefore, we would be faced with what the other 40 might
consider a discriminatory allocation of licenses, would we not?
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.
53.

54.

10 CFR Part 55, released June 27, 1955, 20 Fed. Register 4658, June 30, 1955. CCH
Atomic Energy Law Reporter, Paragraph 9710.
10 CFR Part 70, 20 Fed. Register 2491, April 15, 1955. CCH Atomic Energy Law
Reporter, Paragraph 9715.
10 CFR Part 20, released July 11, 1955. 20 Fed. Register Number 138, Page 5101,
July 16, 1955. CCH Atomic Energy Law Reporter, Paragraph 9701.
For example, see AEC-378 (Application for Access Permit); AEC-2 (Application
for License to Transfer Uranium or Thorium Source Material); AEC-3 (Monthly
Report of Uranium Producers); AEC-4 (Report of Processors); AEC-5 (Report of
Distributors); AEC-6 (Report of Consumers); AEC-7 (Export License Application);
AEC-8 (Application to Receive Excess Source Material) ; AEC-250 (Export License).
Bureau of National Affairs, Atomic Industry Reporter, Number 9, August 3, 1955,
p. 1:62.
The author wishes to express his thanks to Mr. A. Bryan Marvin, Assistant Director
of Public Information of the Consolidated Edison Company of New York, for the
opportunity of seeing the company's application for a license to build a nuclear
reactor.
1954 Joint Committee Hearings, p. 231.
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"If you were among that 40, would you not want to have the
right of appeal to an objective and independent board to see why
you were disqualified and a competitor was given the license?"
He further pointed out: 55
"If opportunities are to be opened up to private enterprise in
the atomic-energy field, Government controls necessary for maintaining security, health, safety, and other basic measures should be
administered in a fair and impartial manner. I deem it essential
that persons or finns who have grounds for believing fair treatment
has been denied them in regard to licensing or other actions should
be accorded the right of appeal to an independent review board or
tribunal apart from the Atomic Energy Commission itself."
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gives an applicant the right to have
the determination of the Atomic Energy Commission as to whether he
should be issued a license or not reviewed by the courts. The section dealing with licenses 56 requires that they be issued in accordance with Chapter
16 of the Act. Section 181 of Chapter 16 makes the Administrative Procedure Act 5 7 applicable to the Atomic Energy Commission.
No cases have arisen in the courts wherein the determination by the
Atomic Energy Commission that an applicant should not receive a license
has been challenged. The reason for this is undoubtedly due to the fact
that the licensing provision was so recently added. However, there have
been a few cases wherein, directly or indirectly, the action of the Atomic
Energy Commission was challenged. The courts, in such cases, have been
uniformly reluctant to overturn a determination of the Atomic Energy
Commission. 58 For example, in United Electrical, Radio, and Machine
Workers of America, et al. v. Lilienthal, et al.,59 the court said:

"The action of AEC of which the plaintiffs complain was authorized by the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1801 et seq.; the
court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action in that
the complaint seeks to control executive action committed by law
to the discretion of the Atomic Energy Commission, and this court
will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion; the complaint
contains no sufficient allegation that the action of AEC, complained of, was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion;
no substantial constitutional question is presented; the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq., is not applicable
to the case."
National Coal Association et al. v. Federal Power Commission60 is to
the same effect. In that case, the National Coal Association filed a petition
55.

Ibid., p. 23.

56.
57.

Sec. 103a.
60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. 1001, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq. And see CCH Atomic Energy
Law Reporter, Paragraph 2028.

58.

See: Fletcher et al v. Watson, 204 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; Fletcher v. United States
Atomic Energy Commission, 192 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1951); U.S. v. Hodge et ux., 89

F.Supp. 25 (Dist. Ct. E.D. Tenn., 1949) ; U.S. v .40.75 Acres of Land, 76 F.Supp. 239
(Dist. Ct. N.D. Il., 1948).

59.

84 F.Supp. 640 (D.C. Cir. 1949).

60.

191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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to review an order of the Federal Power Commission granting a certificate
of convenience and necessity for construction of a gas pipeline to supply
the Atomic Energy Commission's plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The
court held that the record sustained the grant of the certificate. Writing
for the majority, Judge Hazen said:
"It is enough to say that the Commission properly assessed
great weight to the Atomic Energy Commission's view that the
safety and well-being of the nation required use of natural gas as
a fuel at its Oak Ridge plant, and that the proposed pipeline would
adequately provide the gas needed for the manufacture of fissionable materials."
And in a concurring opinion, Judge Clark went even further. He said:
"It must be remembered that no seller or producer of coal
or any other fuel or of railroads or any other form of transportation has a vested right to force consumers to retain dependence on
a fuel or form of transportation in which they have lost confidence. If they lose business it is largely because of their own
antics in creating frequent crises, by way of strikes or threats of
strikes, which leave the users at the mercy of their whims."
"Moreover in this case there is a special consideration in so
far as public convenience and necessity is concerned. The Record
shows that the Oak Ridge plant is a huge plant engaged in producing materials vital to the nation's safety, perhaps even its life.
It is further shown that it is absolutely necessary to operate the
plant seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day and that if the
boilers should be shut down for even five minutes it would
require at least two to three years to get them in full operation
again.
"Under such circumstances, it is folly to say that this vital
defense effort shall be left to the tender mercies of the contending
parties here with the strong possibility that at some crisis in
our affairs this important security agency might be suddenly
paralyzed. The Federal Power Commission wisely and properly
followed the recommendation and request of the Atomic Energy
Commission."
However, the courts have indicated that they will review a determination of the Atomic Energy Commission if such determination was arbitrarily
arrived at. In United States v. Taylor's Oak Ridge Corporation,,' the court
said:
"As to whether defendant's bid should have been accepted in
preference to others is not a subject for judicial review, the decision therein being an exercise of administrative functions of the
Atomic Energy Commission. While the court has not been referred to any statute which excludes the matter from judicial
review, this Court over a period of several years has had many
occasions to consider whether it should undertake a review of
purely administrative procedures of Government agencies. Where
there has been no violation of a vested right, this court has consistently refused to intervene in such administrative affairs .
"
61.

89 F.Supp. 28 (U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Tenn., 1950).
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While this court has declined to intervene in the adminis-

trative decisions of government agencies, it has not foreclosed itself
from doing so, in the event it should appear that an agency has
acted arbitrarily and capriciously to the detriment of a party
dealing with it .. "
Hence, an applicant who feels that his application for a license was arbitrarily refused by the Atomic Energy Commission does have an effective
remedy in the courts.
5.

CONCLUSION

The issuance of licenses by the Atomic Energy Commission for the
building of facilities for the commercial production of atomic energy
should be on the broadest plane consistent with the maintenance of public
health and safety and the protection of national security. The standard
that the Atomic Energy Commission should use ought to be: Will the
issuance of this license involve a risk of harm to the public, rather than,
will the issuance of this license benefit the public? A person who puts up
his own money should be entitled to spend it on any type of project, however foolish the Atomic Energy Commission thinks it is, that he wants to,
so long as there is no danger to anyone else. And the courts ought to review
the determination of the Atomic Energy Commission with a critical eye
to see that it adhers to this standard. Only in that way can the maximum
progress of the American atomic energy industry be assured.

